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14 What Authorizes the Image? The Visual
Economy of Post-Secular Jurisprudence
RICHARD K. SHERWIN

What appears in the image field is not subordina te to existing reality, it constitutes that reality.
Katharina Grosse'
The soul actualizes truth through the experience of sublimity.
Werner Herzog2

On the Nature of "Visual Economy"
Picture a canvas by Mark Rothko: let's say, "Four Darks in Red " (1958)
(figure 14.1): Across an expanse nearly ten feet wide, four bands of colour are laid out one after another - brown , the thinnest; black, the most
expansive; then maroon and red. The black has the most weigh t; it is
portentous in its depth. All four bands seem to drift in an encomp assing sea of roseate light, which suffuses around the cloud-like edges of
the slightly darker, lower band. That band h as been made to contract
further away from the edges of the painting than the other three, as if
the light behind it could not be contained . Absent figures or rep resentations of an y kind, there are no stories to tell. Word s fall away, as will
happen when one is immersed in music. All that remains is the slow
dance of these shimmering colour forms, and your ow n gaze feeling
its way across, around, and within the canvas. It is a strange visual
dance, as if accompanied by an otherworldly score, watching subtle
hues (black w ithin black, red w ithin red) separate out and move among
themselves w ithin each separate band, as each band oscillates against
the unsettled borders of its neighbour, and the ensemble oscillates
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together as a unified whole within the larger luminous field of incandescent red. Without words, affect surges. An uncanny joy pierces the
heart, a deathly despair, an insistent hope - as of daybreak ...
Where are we? How did we get here? What does it mean? And what
could this possibly have to do with law?
In order to gain our bearings we first need to grapple with the word
"economy," and in particular with the notion of a visual economy. It
is not the exchange of capital, commodities, and labour that I have in
mind here, but rather an earlier meaning for "economy" - one that
derives from the Greek oikonomia: oikos, meaning "dwelling place,"
and nomia meaning management or organization, especially of worldly

Figure 14.1 Mark Rothko (1903-70). "Four Darks in Red" (1958). Oil on canvas,
10113/16 x 1163/8in. (258.6 x 295.6 cm). Whitney Museum of American Art,
New York; purchase, with funds from the Friends of the Whitney Museum of
American Art, Mr. and Mrs. Eugene M. Schwartz, Mrs. Samuel A. Seaver and
Charles Simon. Photography by Sheldan C. Collins.
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affairs. Economy in this sense is the place where things of this world are
properly administered. 3 Reflecting on the way we manage the world
(or worlds) we live in invites us to consider anew the different moral
values and aesthetic registers through which reality takes shape for us.
How do things and others in the world appear?
In order to take shape first there must be a space to take place in, an
oikos. So we ask, what is the nature of the space in which things appear
and circulate around us?4 How are the various elements of what appears
organized in that space? What is their nomia? As soon as we speak of
appearances, we confront time as well as space: a before and after. Out
of what did it appear? How do we understand the relation between the
appearance and its source? Its authorship, if you will. What is it that
authorizes such a presence? "In the image of" what does it appear?
What is its mode of emergence, transmission, encounter? How is to be
understood? What does it demand of us? These are the so.r ts of questions a visual economy is meant to account for.
Human institutions, including law, reflect and implement a dominant visual economy. In different eras, different cultures have enjoyed
vastly different visual economies. For instance, in Homeric Greece one
encounters the economy of display where physical and social worth is
constructed by the other's gaze. "Look at me!" Achilles says in the Iliad.
"Do you not see how beautiful, noble and great I am?"5 Yet, by the fifth
century BCE, in the democratic Athenian polis, the economy of public
display has transformed into an economy of public speech. The citizen's gaze now produces (and is a product of) the field of public performance constituted as participatory spectator and political contestant.6
Or consider Byzantium, in the eleventh century, the time of Constantine. For Orthodox iconophilic Christians like Nikephoros, the gaze
was constituted by the economy of the Incarnation. It is the Incarnation
that lets the world be seen. An invisible God must sacrifice an intimate
part of himself, his only Son, in order to create a visible space for God's
infinite presence in the world. The Incarnation - the way the infinite
occupies material space - must be sacrificial, broken, kenotic, for the
infinite will not appear. It always recedes from view. The icon unified
the administration of worldly affairs (including law, belief, and material goods) in the image of God's sacrifice of His only Son. The economic imaginary of the icon modelled that sacrifice. When God became
flesh (as word/image/body) the world became visible. 7
As these examples may suggest, different visual economies establish
the world we live in by constituting how the eye sees.8 How do we
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know reality? What constitutes its truth? Does it touch the tactile image
(in the presence of a pious painter like Giotto)? Does it break with form
in the quest for unseen reality (before the uncanny coloured splotches
of Fra Angelica, say, or Vermeer)?9 Closer to our own time, we may
ask whether reality is present in the ecstatic, despairing colour fields
of Rothko and the numinous, post-secular spaces of Barnett Newman?
Or does it appear to us more like a jumble of fragmented remains, disparate feelings, or non-signifying affects, as we dance on the surface of
visual forms in ornamental delight, as when we watch a Hollywood
blockbuster, momentarily casting our lot with the life of another for a
cry or a laugh before the screen goes dark? A matter, we might say, of
image as Hollywood idol.
If the visual economy constitutes the reality in which we live, including the network of beliefs, laws, and institutions that make up our
worldly existence, who is (or will be) master of the image? 10 What
authorizes the image? What is the source of law's legitimacy in the
"visiocracy" we call home?11
From Iconology to Semiotics (and Back Again)

On the heels of the ruinous, seemingly endless religious and civil wars
of the seventeenth century, early modern Europeans began to turn their
gaze away from sectarian sources for legal authority. Foremost among
them in this regard was Thomas Hobbes. It was Hobbes who gave us the
political triad of sovereignty (the "artificial Soul"), positive law ("artificial Reason"), and the state (that artificial Leviathan, also known as the
Commonwealth), bound togeth~r by contract: ceding power to the one,
or the many, who represents the people. 12 In short, it was Hobbes who
first blazed the trail for secular positivist legal thinking. The state and
its laws were now viewed as manifestly human constructs, authorized
not by God but by collective consent. Law ruled semiotically: defining
the terms of representation and exchange. Over the years, as transcendental references continued to weaken, the premodern visual economy
of living symbols entered a prolonged state of collapse. This development pushed semiotics to the limits of its legitimating power, and perhaps beyond.
What would it be like to reimagine law not simply in terms of semiotics or abstract concepts, but also as a visual economy, a matter of
embodied seeing? What would it mean to picture a corpus less akin
to Hobbes's legal machinery than to a network of interlinked, living
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symbols, where rational categories yield at least equal respect to embodied states and embodied knowledge (affects, feelings, emotions),13 and
in which legal institutions that establish and maintain basic concepts
(such as due process, equal protection, and liberty for all) also help to
express and perform a preferential range of shared emotions? Imagine
a state in which everyone recognizes that structures of feelings help to
create both individual identity and social reality, and in which legal
institutions help us to avoid "bad civic passions" (such as fear, envy,
and shame) while promoting the good (compassion, respect, perhaps
even love). 14
What if law were viewed less as a metric system than a musical
composition, a public performance, a work of art: not simply a passive
archive of written rules, policies, and principles, but also, and perhaps
even more importantly, a theatre in which we perform a shared reality,
clearing a space- an oikos -for reality to appear? What could make that
happen?
When semiotics began to displace living symbols, science took over
from theology and the humanities, displacing rhetoric in particular
as the leading source of authorized knowledge. 15 In the disembodied
epistemology of science, non-sensual truth becomes, as Heidegger
put it, a matter of discerning the adequation between image and some
underlying model. What is "adequate" in this context is a function of
some form of imitation or measurement, whether it is based on a Platonic ideal form or an alternative metrical system. In this kind of visual
economy - let us call it the economy of "mimesis as imitation" - good
images are accurate copies.
Now while science may excel in establishing conditions of accurate
measurement based on formal conditions of validity, it is sorely lacking in providing a basis for structures of feeling, or a preferred network of embodied knowledge. Science is not cut out to express what
binds us to a particular model or belief. Discerning the source of an
uncanny or sublime presence, what Heidegger calls "the ecstatic play
of the world," is beyond its ken. The economy of the sublime, of mimesis
as appearance or event,16 insists upon a very different ground of truth
than accurate imitation. Symbolic or iconic truth coincides with what
the image reveals in our encounter with it. This kind of phenomenological exchange in the face of the iconic image is more akin to performance. Something happens. The image brings something (perhaps
some form of being) into a clearing, created within the space of the
image, for the gaze to encounter. 17

What Authorizes the Image?

335

Experiencing law's validity as a matter of its compliance with the
right set of rules or principles without any sense of its felt significance,
which is to say, without an adequate account of what binds us to law's
authority in the first place,18 leads us to Kafka's law: a law that is valid,
but lacks significance. 19 For Gersholm Scholem, this encounter with the
dead spirit of the law describes the nothingness of revelation, the zero
point of law and politics, the state of exception. Valid legal forms may
proliferate in baroque and neo-baroque spectacle, but that profusion
cannot distract us forever from sensing the emptiness at the core. 20 To
counter that lack requires an event - the advent of meaning.
Scientific objectivity can tell us nothing about the advent of law's
significance. For that we need living symbols in the visual economy
of presence. We can see this is so when we consider the genealogy of
law's legitimation over time. For example, it was the visual economy
of the Incarnation - that phantasmal presence in the imperial coin
(the emperor in the image of Christ),21 the Orthodox icon, 22 the king's
two bodies,23 and the legal emblem24 - that once authorized law's
worldly power, "making power visible," 25 giving proof to its invisible spiritual source. 26
In the pre- and early modern visual economy of the living icon
the image precedes the word. 27 As Goodrich points out, the tripartite
structure of the legal emblem recapitulates the threefold unity of the
Incarnation, the image made flesh. 28 But over time, what began as a
transcendental, symbolic visual economy devolved into something far
different: a secular legal positivism, the modern semiotic economy of
signs and definitions.
And yet, there remained a ghost in the secular machinery of positive
law: the enigmatic aura, the unrepresentable, inconceivable (but perhaps not insensible) "Other" of law. In the material semiotic age of science and technology, the economy of signs appeared to have displaced
the auratic symbol. But like Banquo's ghost, it "will not down."29 What
could be the source today of such a phantasmal legitimating presence?
From what visual economy could it arise?
Post-secular Jurisprudence:The New Visual Economy of Presence

Eric Santner locates a crucial shift in the visual economy of the early
modern legal emblem from the "King's two bodies" (secular and
divine) to the "People's two bodies." The sovereign that the people create by contracting their rights to their representative contains a surplus,
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an irreducible excess that Santner calls "the flesh" ("a sublime somatic
materiality").30 This uncanny surplus describes what remains of transcendence.31It is what passes from the divine sovereignty of the King to
the popular sovereignty of the People.
Imagine the Hobbesian contract of civil representation not simply as
words in a document, but also as something iconic in its overdetermination. What if, in order to fit on the page, the social contract could
not contract enough the foundational source of power it was meant to
carry? What if we viewed that constitutive contract as a living symbol,
an icon, which is to say, irreducibJe to words alone?32
What spirit hovers behind the visible signs of civil commitment,
as if scintillating within a sea of roseate light on a canvas painted by
Rothko? If we were to try to imagine such a possibility, how would we
describe its visual economy?
In our psychological times, we might well begin with interior space,
the domain of libido. That is Santner's point of departure: the flesh
imagined as an invisible residue of uncontainable, uncircumscribable transcendence, for libido (unconscious Eros) always exceeds the
material body. In Freudian terms, when we "cathect" libido - transferring Eros from our body to something beyond it, including expressive
forms - we enter into relation with those forms, including others and
the world around us. We might say that the body politic acts similarly.
We collectively invest libidinal energy in, and thus bind with various
objects, others, stories, and ideals. These in tum become charged with
libidinal excess. If the object in question is a document, a contract or
foundational constitution, say, that excess is the felt presence that binds
us. In this sense, the social bond is an excess of meaning. It charges and
sustains (so long as it lasts) a shared belief in a cultural construct, an
oikonomia, if you will, that legitimates the power of the state.
This is how we might talk about a contract that rules with uncanny
vitality, as an emotional construct, or a symbolic form of life. Thi~ is the
enigmatic flesh of the law imagined in terms of a sublime materiality.33
An economy ("oikonomia") imagined as that space in which we manage
the material world (of goods and institutions) in the image of something uncontainable, something sublime.
Santner calls this uncanny phenomenon "the royal remains." It is, he
says, how the king's transcendent body appears in modernity: how the
enigmatic presence of the royal remains was reconstituted in the body
politic of popular sovereignty.34 But it doesn't just happen, like a transaction in which goods, or goods and currency, are exchanged in a sale
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that's final. It persists. Or it doesn't. Its viability depends on a currency
that doesn't appear at all, namely, libidinal cathexis. Without that animus, that uncanny surplus, the laws may be valid but lack significance.
Under such conditions, legitimacy is but a rumour.
That is the revolutionary ramification of spiritual and libidinal capital: absent its enigmatic presence the social contract fails. If the basis
for a particular cultural form of life disappears, if the currency - What
Santner calls "biocratic investiture"35 - that makes a legal regime function, becomes too weak to support the state's demands, the constitutive structure of belief collapses. If libidinal investment sustains the ·
state, libidinal dis-investment (collective de-cathexis) augurs its fall,
its deadly spiral into the state of exception, the zero point of law and
politics, a state of perpetual terror. That is what happens when we withdraw our love for objects and others in the world around us. The external world crumbles, mirroring an internal catastrophe.36
Let's see if there is a visual economy in which we can visualize the
flesh of the law in a similarly corporeal representation.
Reimagining the Visual Economy of Post-secular Jurisprudence
In art, the unspoken, unfigurable source of beauty calls to us. It demands

a response from the spectator's gaze. The relationship we enter in the
poetic space of beauty's presence is described in the phenomenology
of aesthetics.37 In law, justice likewise comes to us as an infinite, uncontainable force. We stand before the Other, whose suffering demands a
response. In the visual economy of law justice hovers beyond the field
of our vision, like an uncanny, enigmatic presence. It haunts us. Always
unrealized, always beyond our grasp - and yet, it is justice that animates law, lending it significance. We feel this, particularly in certain
forms and performances of law, even if we cannot always name it. That
feeling binds us to law. Our cathected relationship to others and objects
(including texts and ideals) is a relationship of significance. We may
describe this as the phenomenology of the ethical. 38
What Eric Santner calls "the royal remains" coincides with the phantasmal presence that invisibly bestows legitimacy upon law. In the
immediate aftermath of the French revolution, Santner senses that
presence in Jacques-Louis David's famous painting, "Death of Marat."
Santner credits art historian T.J. Clark with the critical insight at work
here. Quoting Clark: "In the cult of Marat [David saw] the first forms of
a liturgy and ritual iri which the truths of the revolution itself would be
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made flesh- People, Nation, Virtue, Reason, Liberty."39 But how would
such a "liturgy" find an appropriate form of expression? Santner discerns an aesthetic revolution at work in David's painting. It emerges
as a new kind of abstraction. The painter "seems to make Marat much
the same substance - the same abstract material - as the empty space
above him."40 Equating that enigmatic space with the King's sublime
body ("the flesh"), this abstraction of sovereignty, its sudden vacancy,
symbolizes "the impossible representation of the People." 41
Revolutionary, indeed. No less is at stake than the dissolution of the
iconic representation of the Incarnation of Christ, established for centuries, as the underlying model for the King's transcendental body. What
we are witnessing is a profound shift in the visual economy of law
and politics. According to Santner, the inability to represent the royal
remains in the transcendental body of the People (an aporia he refers to
as "representational deadlock") 42 describes the status of popular sovereignty in the post-Revolutionary age of modernity. The masses who
once comprised the Hobbesian Leviathan (pictured in the famous frontispiece of Hobbes' mid-seventeenth-century political handbook) have
now dissolved into an absence. This charged absence is the abstract
animated field we all carry within ourselves: the uncontainable excess
of Eros. In this new visual economy, popular sovereignty is animated by
a libidinal excess, or somatic surplus of immanence that every citizen
carries within his or her own body.
With Rothko, and the mid-twentieth-century emergence of abstract
expressionism in general, the visual economy of the image that we first
witnessed in David's enigmatic abstraction has developed even further. Now all representational form has been evacuated. Only a shimmering coloured field remains. The mysterious legitimating source of
somatic excess, the royal remains that have been transferred to popular
sovereignty, has become an entirely abstract expression. But this may
hardly come as a source of political comfort. After all, how many people see (much less seek out) in the work of Rothko a source of iconic
mastery - making a space for the mystery of the infinite to materialize
in the world? A source of legitimacy that has grown this esoteric, so far
removed from more familiar rites and liturgies of popular investiture,
is an unlikely basis for a sustainable visual economy of law.
Yet, without understating the gravity of an incipient legitimation crisis that has dogged the liberal state throughout late modernity,43 access
to a source of legitimation may lie closer to hand. Perhaps as close as
the nearest screen.
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If we begin with the ontology of the image, before long - amidst the
various registers of being, from sublime presence to sensorial delight,
that different kinds of images allow (or preclude) -we come across what
visual ethnographer David MacDougal calls "the corporeal image." 44
MacDougal's notion of seeing with the whole body may be read against
the current cultural backdrop of the "affective turn," including renewed
interest in embodied or "synaesthetic" knowledge. 45 Of particular interest here is what the corporeal image cannot configure, which is to say,
our encounter with its· excess, the sublime shimmer that accompanies
its mysterious overdetermination.46 That excess is what makes us shudder when we gaze upon the charged abstract colour fields of a work
by Rothko, or the sudden, inexplicable vacancy in David's "Marat."
The surplus of immanence that we encounter in the ontological field of
corporeal images is irreducible to what we see there.
Film, television, and video images, on screens large and small,
serve as immensely accessible "popular" sites where corporeal
(among many other kinds of) images are in continuous play. The
vast circulation of images made possible by new visual technologies keeps alive the prospect that the mysterious source of popular
sovereignty in the visual economy of law remains before us. At the
same time, however, the very profusion of visual images today also
keeps alive the prospect of continued obscurity, burying the corporeal image in the neo-baroque clamour and clutter of undifferentiated visual spectacle. 47
This defines the visual challenge of our time. Before law's legitimation may be stabilized within a still emergent visual economy, enough
contemporary artists, cultural critics, and jurists need be amassed to
assimilate and clarify its aesthetic and ethical demands and registers.
Only then can that vision be broadly and effectively distributed and
shared within the body politic. This process of clarification may well
be the most profound task of culture, namely: to sustain the legal and
political groundwork necessary for both law's and culture's production, maintenance, and vitality.
To illustrate in greater particularity the claim that the "corporeal
image" is closer than the example of abstract expressionism may suggest, one could choose from an extensive archive of films which, to a
greater or lesser degree, shimmer with a kind of uncanny corporeal
excess. The dictates of limited space allow only a brief example here,
drawing on two closely interconnected films by the contemporary filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer.
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The Visual Economy of an Ethically Inflected Aesthetic

Oppenheimer's "The Act of Killing" (2012) and "The Look of Silence"
(2014) not only recapitulate in their subject matter the genealogy of
law's legitimation, but also aesthetically model the way presence in
corporeal images - as well as a deadly vacancy in dizzingly baroque
forms - work on the screen. In short, the films perform an integrated
visual economy for law and politics in which discrete ethical and aesthetic registers dialectically play out.
A group of high-level army officers has staged a coup. To legitimate
their action they characterize it as a necessary response to a ferocious
"enemy within" that is threatening to violently seize the state. In the
aftermath of the coup, they unleash a killing operation in which enemies
of the state (alleged "Communists") are rounded up and slaughtered.
No exact estimate exists, but more than five hundred thousand people
were killed in this way. Violence on such a massive scale exceeded the
capacity of the army without assistance. Accordingly, the state enlisted
a civilian cadre of willing killers within a widely distributed network
of local militias. This happened in Indonesia in 1965-6. The leaders of
the coup remained in power for over four decades thereafter. As coagents of that political and military triumph, the civilian killers were
subsequently praised as heroes of the state. And for all these years, the
survivors of mass violence, along with the families and friends of the
victims, were subjected to continued oppression (from crude shakedowns in the marketplace to the utter silencing of political dissent) by
the thugs, gangsters, and neo-fascist militias that continued to serve the
state's needs. ·
Enter Joshua Oppenheimer, who asks: What is it like to live with the
knowledge that you have murdered in cold blood scores, perhaps even
hundreds, of innocent people? And what is it like for the victims to live
within a regime of such repressive silence? "The Act of Killing" poses
the first question. "The Look of Silence" poses the second.
Oppenheimer found that the aging killers, when approached, were
only too happy to recount the brutal torture and mass murder that they
had committed in their youth. And so the filmmaker enters a strange
state of play, providing the killers both the opportunity and the technical means to make a film of their violent and sadistic exploits. Anwar
Congo, white-haired now, rail thin, charismatic, and tortured by his
past, despite the apparent comfort of his social status, is the chief protagonist in this creative venture. As he moves from scene to scene,
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we are thrust into his visual world. Culturally immersed in the westerns and crime noirs of Hollywood, Congo's visual vocabulary is rich
and astute. He uses his film knowledge to play out fantasies of denial
together with recollections of violence and death that incessantly fill his
mind, some images more persistently, more hauntingly, than others. As
it turns out, nightmares disturb Congo's sleep. He can't stop seeing the
open eyes of the decapitated head of a random victim that he left like
litter on the killing ground. As if to purge his demons, Congo stages
his worst deeds, one after another. Brutal scenes of sadistic torture and
killing by strangulation with a wire, in which Congo sometimes is the
killer, sometimes the victim, are interspersed with majestic waterfalls,
beautiful dancing girls, and carnivalesque cross dressing (for Congo,
the would-be film director, is well aware that an audience also must
have beauty and humour or they will turn their attention elsewhere).
Bizarre, surreal, perverse: the film moves from one scene to the next,
accelerating into the terrible fever dream that we come to recognize as
Congo's anguished internal state. As if the impossible cognitive dissonance in which he lives, oscillating between "state hero" and "murder-.
ous beast," cannot hold. The visual economy of Congo's existence is
one of terror and violence. One image follows another, dizzying in their
mad profusion. Nothing adds up. Congo's baroque world of proliferating spectacles of extreme violence and sensual delight remains unstable
at its core. Perhaps that is what animates the profusion in the first place.
The nothingness at the centre of vision must be avoided at all costs, for
fear of total collapse.48
The folly of Congo's visual staging is soon evident. The cumulative
details of self-deceptive denial and self-lacerating violence (as in the
scene where a crazed perpetrator forces Congo's decapitated head to
swallow his own liver) know no resolution. They can only quicken.
And as they quicken, the fever dream intensifies, until it finally reaches
a culmination - and the house of cards that is Anwar Congo's mental
world falls apart. That collapse appears in the final scene in "The Act of
Killing." We see Congo standing on the same rooftop where he killed so
many of his victims in cold blood decades ago. He is silent, seemingly
reflective. And then he begins to heave, again and again convulsive
retching overtakes his frail, wracked body. It is the body's unconscious
knowledge enacting what Congo's tortured mind lacks the power to
utter. Not just an isolated killer, but a whole society, a political regime
based squarely upon a massive outburst of killing, has been revealed in
a vertiginous, baroque image world well suited to feverish horror. The
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root of that horror and the futility of its denial are laid bare: the rottenness at the state's core. As Freud wrote of Daniel Paul Schreber: "His
subjective world has come to an end since his withdrawal of his love
from it."49 An internal catastrophe that mirrors the external catastrophe
in which Congo all too willingly participated has finally come to dominate the world in which he lives.
Here is a living image of law in the flesh, suited to a failed political
state under neo-baroque conditions: a world of incessant tableaux and
transmuting personas, one supplanting the other in quick succession,
one after another passing away in a wild proliferation of transmogrifying images, bound in the end to run their final catastrophic course: the
heaving, mute, destitute body. Congo is trapped in a perpetual state
of emergency. No matter how many representational forms or visual
images may be placed at his disposal, the result remains the same. Endgame. Psychological catastrophe within, legal and political catastrophe
without. And here, allegorically speaking, is where Indonesian society
might remain, unable to acknowledge its violent past, continuing its
acts of denial and oppression. Here at the zero point of politics, a state
of terror within collectively mirrors a state of terror without.
In his second film, Oppenheimer shifts from the perpetrator's mindset to that of the victim. Along the way, we witness a corresponding
shift in visual economy. Adi is now the main protagonist. His brother,
Ramli, was brutally tortured, mutilated, and killed during the Indonesian genocide, a year before Adi was born. Working now as an optometrist, living amidst his brother's killers, Adi's life mission is to speak
truth to power. But it is not vengeance that motivates him. Rather, it is
the need to pierce the veil of oppressive silence, to confront the killers
with their feckless denials, their empty fantasies, their perverse bravado. Do you not see it was wrong? Have you no remorse, no regret?
Such is Adi's refrain as (in no idle metaphor) he calmly fits lenses on the
eyes of the killers around him, or sits across from them, including those
in positions of significant political power.
Forced to hide his identity, resisting threats of renewed violence if he
continues to speak the unspeakable about the past, Adi persists in his
questioning.
lf only the killers could acknowledge the wrongness of their actions,
if only they could take responsibility, and apologize, face to face with
the survivors of so many innocent victims, perhaps reconciliation
might become possible. Perhaps politics may begin anew, based not on
violence, but rather on a deep commitment to empathy (even with the
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Figure 14.2 Adi questions Commander Amir Siahaan, one of the death squad
leaders responsible for his brother's death during the Indonesian genocide,
in Joshua Oppenheimer's documentary "The Look of Silence." Courtesy of
Drafthouse Films and Participant Media.

perpetrators) combined with a profound moral conviction regarding
the necessity of taking responsibility and seeking forgiveness. That is
the moral thrust of truth and reconciliation in Adi's steady gaze.
The aesthetic register of Adi's gaze contrasts sharply with that of
Anwar Congo. The vertiginous, unstable images of Congo's fever
dream have now given way to something calm and steady. Adi's gaze
holds us; it is stable, securely rooted. The silence of the dead, and
the dignity of the living who survive them, pervades every scene in
"The Look of Silence." In these scenes the corporeal image is suffused
with the incalculable demands 9f human suffering, and perhaps, too,
the infinite majesty of human nobility. Adi's morally stable universe is
sustained by the human capacity for relationship, radical empathy, and
the redemptive possibility of forgiveness -perhaps even love. In scene
after scene of everyday life, "The Look of Silence" models for us Adi's
capacity for love: love of his elderly, long-suffering parents, for whom
he must now care, love of his lost brother, who so many years ago.set in
motion the ethical demand of Adi's life mission, and love for his children who will inherit a legacy of suffering and injustice. We see this in
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simple scenes of everyday life: Adi washing his blind and nearly deaf
and demented father - unable now to escape the prison of his grief; Adi
speaking in close intimacy with his careworn mother as she cracks nuts
on a stone; Adi playing with his young daughter, jumping delightedly
on her bed as she humorously mimics her father's sales pitch for new
glasses, and Adi walking with his older son, solemnly explaining the
lies his teachers are telling him at school.
These scenes of the survivor's everyday life are suffused with moral
fortitude and love. But above all it is the silence of countless victims
that animates Adi's gaze in the face of the killers around him, intensifying Adi's morally robust silence against the crude pitch of the perpetrators' threats and deceptions. The filmmaker's love for Adi, and
for Adi's parents and children, instantiates and models the moral force
that pervades the visual economy of "The Look of Silence," holding out
hope for political renewal through redemptive justice.
Two films; two different interventions in the history of mass murder.
One, a fever dream of incessantly shifting personas, disguises, oscillating wildly from self-deceit to self-conviction, showing us what it is like
to look in the mirror of a perpetrator's life - a life lived in the homeless terror of unacknowledged guilt and shame. Th~ second, almost an
idyll- but for the background of violence and death, and the exquisite,
almost unbearable suffering left in their wake. Yet, for all that, Adi's
calm gaze prevails. We see what it is like to look in the mirror of a
victim condemned to live behind a veil of oppressive silence, but who
refuses to succumb - not with violence or cries for retribution, but with
dignity and moral conviction vouchsafed by the silent authority of the
dead. Adi's gaze aims for forgiveness and reconciliation once the killers themselves, along with those whose power can be directly traced to
that horrific origin, acknowledge the truth, and take responsibility for
the wrongs they have committed.
Two different gazes, two different image worlds - together constituting the visual economy of contemporary Indonesia. But this is not simply an allegory of a society internally riven by a history of unspeakable
violence and oppressive silence. It is also a symbolic visualization of the
way law confronts violence (or fails to), and the way it moves from its
own originary violence to the redemptive possibility of renewed love
for the world. It places before us, in corporeal images of almost unbearable intensity, the mute knowledge of the body: its fevers, its fantasies,
its wretchedness, as well as its dignity, its sweetness, its moral rightness, and its capacity to empathize and to love. Oppenheimer takes us
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to the heart of human mystery in a visual economy that pulsates with
an unrepresentable surplus. From the esoteric challenge of abstract
expressionist fields we have travelled to an almost "microscopically"
examined representational particularity: a handful of perpetrators, a
single family of survivors, among an unfigurable backdrop of so many
others, in a world so intimately portrayed as to ask of us, as Oppenheimer wishes to ask, what would it be like to be this family: to "feel
you are Adi, or your brother is Adi, and Adi's parents are your parents,
your grandparents; Adi's children are your children?"50 In this visual
economy intimacy, empathy, and love pulsate with an uncanny excess.
It is this surplus in representational particularity, Oppenheimer tells
us, that makes us care.51 Perhaps it even makes us want to participate
in what is being performed on the screen, inviting, enticing, inducing
us to enter and invest in this visual economy, to make it our own, even
for law's and politics' sake. In this visual economy, the corporeal image
provides a basis for stabilizing and legitimating the way we manage
and maintain shared beliefs and values in society, the way we make a
place (oikos) for normative reality (nomos).
And so we see the ethical and aesthetic join together in an integrated
visual economy that traces law's tragic origin in violence to its possible
future in redemptive justice. Two different interventions, two different
ruptures: one, the rupture of the veil of denial and lies; the other, the
rupture of an oppressive silence with moral responsibility and the hope
of reconciliation. Notably, this dialectical integration of the ethical and
the aesthetic draws upon all the resources of the body. As Oppenheimer
puts it, in a description of the film editing process: "I wonder whether
this ability to find that mystery ... has to do with the fact these [editorial]
decisions ... are like decisions of all your senses, your tastes, your feeling, your ears, your stomach, your smell. I'm working in a place that is
not about words."52 Rather, a fundamental, unfigurable mystery, a sublime presence, if you will, unites us through the corporeal image. In that
presence the immorality of social and political corruption is manifest. 53
This is Oppenheimer's ethical phenomenology of the empathic gaze. In
empathy, even with a mass murderer like Anwar Congo, we may learn
to acknowledge and responsibly confront the vast complexity of human
nature. For in this view, Anwar Congo is not simply a killer to be dealt
with by the punitive force of law, but also a human being haunted by
the internal terror that his violent deeds have wrought.
With this realization of the shocking, almost unacceptable complexity of humanity we are in a position to seek something more than
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retribution. For retribution remains insensible to the moral responsibility and, along with it, the possibility of reconciliation that comes with
redemptive justice. Thus, Oppenheimer's radically empathic visual
economy of law and politics invites us not to endlessly repeat the mistakes of supplanting one form of violence with another, or one form of
false closure with another - whether it is the perpetrator's self-deceit,
in fantasy or other forms of denial, or the victim'.s (and society's ritual
performance of) false hope that now, at last, the monsters among us
have been purged from the body politic.54 This visual economy of law
cultivates a deeply embodied moral knowledge that makes reconciliation imaginable. It is, as Oppenheimer puts it, "the only way to achieve
the widest possible human dignity." 55
In confronting violence and terror, empathy and love seek to provide
a home for the ghost that haunts the Hobbesian legal machine, and all
comparable legal systems that remain valid but lack significance. It is
not enough to bind the body politic with fear, as Hobbes believed. Fear
may prompt obedience, even acquiescence, but it will never inspire
empathy or fidelity based on a libidinal cathexis that makes a shared
world truly our own. As Giambattista Vico wrote over three centuries ago: "The soul of man must be enticed by corporeal images and
impelled to love, for once it loves it is easily taught to believe. Once it
believes and loves, the fire of passion must be infused into it so as to
break its inertia and force it to will." 56
Without that investment, that erotic cathexis as we might put iftoday,
legal validity without significance is bound to decay, and fall back into
the nothingness .of bare life, a fate akin to the collapse of the vertiginous
image world of Anwar Congo at the end of "The Act of Killing." It is
this catastrophe to which our prolonged crisis of legitimation points.
It is the historic burden of justice to avert that fate. These, then, are the
stakes when we ask what constitutes sovereignty in our time, which
is another way of asking, in what visual economy does law manage
shared beliefs, values, and the circulation of power in the material
world?
Conclusion

The challenge of authorizing the image in the visual economy of law is
twofold: First, we must learn the different ethical and aesthetic registers
that operate within the different visual economies of our time. This is
a matter of visual literacy. It portends the ascendance of visual rhetoric

What Authorizes the Image? 347

as a major player in the theory and practice of law. Second, we must
embrace the ontological (perhaps metaphysical) challenge that accompanies the exploration of non-conceptual, non-metrical, embodied
forms of knowing, as we grapple with the complexity of the uncanny
surplus of corporeal images. Different kinds of images circulate in different visual economies - from the iconic incarnation of early modern
legal emblems to modernist abstraction (David and Rothko) and sublime representation (Oppenheimer), to images as measured imitation
(in the adequation of copy and model) or brute sensorial intensity, in
horror and delight (as we find in the crypto-legitimating charade of the
digital simulacrum).57
In the modern era, the artwork may have "replace[d] the cult of
the holy image."58 But aesthetics alone will not vouchsafe the visual
economy of the law. Law's economy also must be linked to our ongoing commitment to justice. That commitment grows out of a renewed
encounter with an interior libidinal source - in painting, film, and video
images on screens large and small - whose ongoing collective investment binds us to the nomos in which we live. In so doing we legitimate
the living spirit of law's humanity. 59 In the ethically inflected aesthetic
of post-secular jurisprudence, justice is to jurisprudence as beauty ~s to
art. 60 The authority of law as image arises out of and circulates within
an infinite field that we call justice. Eros is the name we give to that
creative force out of which political worlds are made, from bare life,
from the poHtical unconscious known as the flesh of the law. Law's significance finds its uncanny source in that invisible presence. Where the
flesh appears as libidinal excess there lies the source of authority, the
spirit of the law that binds us. As distant as an abstract expressionist
canvas, as close as any neighbour, or indeed any screen on which the
neighbour becomes real to us, that is where we simultaneously behold
both the subject and source of law's judgment and authority. This is
how law persists, iconically, perhaps kenotically, in shimmering corporeal images.
In every era the visual economy of law as image must be learned,
perhaps even created anew, so that the uncircumscribable nature of its
ethical source will be understood, remembered, and practised in the
ways of its time. This realization augurs a renewed integration of law
and the humanities,61 including a renewed reflection upon political theology and the wisdom of the heart in a post-secular age.
For this task to be realized, artist and judge, poet and legislator, need
to engage one another in a joint effort to re-authenticate the symbolic
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basis for our political union. The remains of transcendental excess,
incarnate in the immanent wound of the flesh, must be re-encountered
anew. Without this, we risk becoming as destitute as Anwar Congo
at the end of "The Act of Killing." That is the contemporary lesson of
the poetic and ethically resonant film work of Joshua Oppenheimer,
work that may betoken a sea change in the visual economy of values
and beliefs in which images and laws circulate in society. With radical empathy and the libidinal excess of love that binds us to the world
and to others around us, hope for political renewal remains. That is the
redemptive promise that we learn from the visual economy of Adi's
steady ethical gaze in "The Look of Silence."
Re-authorizing the image of law in our time calls for a reimagined
visual economy in which the ethical sublime, the invisible source of
law's excess (justice as an expression of love?) remains before us: achingly out of reach, yet beckoning, demanding, entreating. As before a
roseate light, rising.
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